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I. INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE OF ARTICLE, AND INTENDED AUDIENCES
SINCE its signing by President Obama on March 18, 2010, the ForeignAccount Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) has been criticized by many in
the financial community.1  The purpose of this Article is to: (i) describe
my perception of the origins of FATCA,2 (ii) discuss selected issues,3 and
finally (iii) make recommendations that may ultimately be helpful to en-
suring FATCA’s success in both the short and long-run.4
This Article is written for several audiences.  The entire Article should
be of interest to students and academics. For tax professionals and my
former colleagues in government, the recommendations in Part IV should
be of most interest.  In addition, on the off-chance a foreign tax adminis-
trator or policy maker reads the Article, Part IV(B)(2) surrounding the
benefits of a multilateral FATCA system to countries other than the United
States should be of interest.
Before diving into the origins of FATCA, it is important to note that
since 2007 the United States has made significant progress in addressing
offshore accounts through a combination of tools, including:
whistleblowers, John Doe summons, exchanges of information pursuant to
tax treaties, two major offshore voluntary compliance initiatives, and the
threat of FATCA.  Having been involved extensively in many of these ef-
forts, it is my sincere hope this progress continues.  Given how quickly
money can move around the world, it is very important for the IRS to have
adequate transparency into the offshore accounts of U.S. taxpayers.
FATCA was a bold, unilateral action by the United States intended to
provide this transparency.  However, it will take time to successfully imple-
ment FATCA and there will be growing pains.  Ultimately, the long-term
success of FATCA may depend upon whether the United States can con-
vince other countries to adopt a similar system, or better yet, join with the
United States in developing a multilateral FATCA system.5  Thus, as the
IRS and Treasury implement FATCA they need to focus on the long-term.
In the short-run, various compromises will need to be made to ease the
initial implementation of FATCA.  Some of those potential compromises
are discussed in this article.6
1. See, e.g., Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Comment Letter to IRS and
Responses, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/tax/by-is-
sue/fatca-resource-library/e7d4e74a9f948310VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (providing links to many comment letters pertaining to
FATCA).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV(B).
6. See infra Part IV(A).
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II. ORIGINS OF FATCA
A. Background
Although U.S. taxpayers have been hiding income overseas for years,7
the IRS historically had little success pursuing such income.  The primary
reason for this failure was that foreign financial institutions(FFIs) did not
report any information to the IRS.  Occasionally the IRS became aware of
an offshore account,8 but effectively U.S. taxpayers were on the honor sys-
tem.  Given what has transpired since 2007, it would appear many U.S.
taxpayers with offshore accounts have not been very honest.9
During the period 1999–2003, two events occurred that are worth not-
ing.  First, the IRS started to have some success pursuing offshore accounts
when it (i) obtained credit card information from John Doe summons10,
and (ii) in 2003 offered its first offshore voluntary compliance initiative
(referred to herein as the 2003 OVCI).11  The 2003 OVCI resulted in ap-
proximately 1,300 individuals identifying themselves to the IRS with ap-
proximately $75 million collected through July 2003.12  The knowledge
obtained by the IRS from successfully pursuing various John Doe sum-
mons13 and structuring the 2003 OVCI would prove valuable in the IRS’s
future efforts pursuing offshore accounts in Switzerland starting in 2008.
7. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Morgenthau, Jr., U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, to
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of U.S. (May 29, 1937), available at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15413#axzz1qRIOpHZ8 (explaining why
tax collections are less than anticipated).  In this letter, Secretary Morgenthau de-
scribes offshore accounts held by U.S. taxpayers as part of the problem. Id.
8. For example, the IRS was occasionally made aware by a whistleblower such
as a former business partner or former spouse.
9. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, REP. ON TAX
HAVEN BANKS & U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 9 (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.
hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-psi-staff-report-tax-haven-banks-and-us-tax-
compliance-july-17-2008 [hereinafter PSI STAFF REPORT].  The report was prepared
for a July 17, 2008 hearing by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations (PSI). See generally id.  Per the PSI report, UBS had approximately 20,000
U.S. customers of which only 1,000 (i.e., 5%) were “declared” accounts implying
that 95% of UBS’s U.S. accounts may have been evading U.S. tax. See id.at 9.  The
20,000 accounts had an aggregate value of approximately $18 billion. See id.
10. See Offshore Credit Card Program (OCCP),INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105698,00.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2003)
(providing brief summary of IRS efforts issuing John Doe summons surrounding
credit cards).
11. See IRS Unveils Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative; Chance for “Credit-
Card Abusers” to Clear Up Their Tax Liabilities, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 14,
2003), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105689,00.html.
12. See Offshore Compliance Program Shows Strong Results, INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE (July 30, 2003), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=111987,00.html
(providing results of 2003 OVCI).  Although the IRS tried to portray the 2003
OVCI as a significant success, it was generally viewed as disappointing within the
agency because a relatively small number of U.S. taxpayers participated and the
amount of money collected was not that significant.
13. A John Doe summons is defined as “any summons where the name of the
taxpayer under investigation is unknown and therefore not specifically identified.”
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The second event occurred on January 1, 2001 which was the effective
date for implementation of the United States’ Qualified Intermediary
(QI) system.14  Prior to 2001, FFIs generally did not (i) collect U.S. tax
documentation with respect to either U.S. or foreign taxpayers, (ii) with-
hold U.S. tax, (iii) file information returns with the IRS, or (iv) submit to
IRS oversight.  As a result, there were two major problems:
• A U.S. taxpayer could invest in U.S. source assets with a FFI, but the
FFI was not required to report anything to the IRS.15
• U.S. withholding agents (e.g., U.S. banks) were not obtaining ade-
quate documentation from FFIs to document a reduced U.S. with-
holding tax rate on payments to foreign customers of such FFIs.
This result was not surprising given that the FFI had the customer
relationship, and the U.S. withholding agent did not.  Plus, the FFI
was not anxious to share the identity of its clients with a potential
competitor (i.e., a U.S. bank).
When implementing the QI system, U.S. tax authorities were attempt-
ing to address these two problems.  As a result, the QI system generally
required QIs to identify their customers.  If they were foreign customers,
the QI could keep the identity of their customer secret as long as the cor-
rect amount of U.S. withholding tax was imposed on any payments of U.S.
source income to such customer.  For U.S. customers, the QI was required
to report to the IRS any U.S. source income.  In order to keep the QIs
honest, the QI system required an “audit”16 of the QI by either the IRS or
an independent auditor.17
It is important to note that the QI system was a major advancement
when compared to the pre-2001 world, especially with respect to determin-
ing the correct amount of withholding tax to be applied on payments to
foreigners.  However, as time passed, it became very apparent that the QI
system was not working well at preventing U.S. taxpayers from using off-
shore accounts to avoid U.S. tax.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.5.7.2 (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-005-007.html.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(5) (2001).
15. A U.S. taxpayer could also invest in non-U.S. source assets and avoid re-
porting, but the failure to report income from U.S. source assets was particularly
troubling.
16. This was not a real audit.  Rather, it was more analogous to an “agreed
upon procedures report.”
17. Although there may have been a handful of QIs that requested the IRS to
audit them, substantially all QIs hired an independent auditor (e.g., one of the Big
4 accounting firms) because they did not want the names of their foreign custom-
ers made available to the IRS.  Many QIs were fearful the customer’s name could
be reported by the IRS to a foreign tax authority through information exchange
agreements.
4
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B. Problems with the QI System
Although the QI system did include some reporting with respect to
U.S. taxpayers, there were several major loopholes that were exploited by
U.S. taxpayers and their advisors to avoid reporting income to the IRS.
For example:
• Foreign Source Income Not Reported—The QI system only required QIs
to report to the IRS the U.S. source income of their U.S. customers.
Because foreign source income was not reported, many U.S. taxpay-
ers invested in foreign source assets to avoid reporting.  When the
QI system was first implemented in 2001, many U.S. taxpayers that
had previously invested in U.S. source assets through a FFI con-
verted those assets to foreign source assets and continued to avoid
reporting to the IRS.
• No Requirement to Determine the Beneficial Owner—The QI system did
not specifically require that QIs look-through foreign shell entities
to determine the underlying beneficial owner.  Thus, if a U.S. tax-
payer wanted to invest in U.S. source assets, it could establish a for-
eign shell entity (or entities) and argue under the QI system that
the entity was the beneficial owner of the income.18  In such case,
the QI took the position that the foreign entity should be viewed as
the beneficial owner under the QI regime and no reporting to the
IRS was required.  When the QI system was implemented, many
U.S. taxpayers that had previously invested in U.S. assets and did
not want to convert those assets to foreign source assets contributed
their U.S. source assets to a foreign shell entity (or entities) and
continued to avoid reporting to the IRS.
• QI Could Represent Only a Portion of the Worldwide Accounts—Because
the primary emphasis of the QI system was to make sure the proper
withholding tax was charged on payments to foreigners, the QI sys-
tem allowed FFIs to designate those accounts that were part of the
QI system.  This was done to avoid the QI having to perform de-
tailed due diligence procedures on its entire customer base, espe-
cially those that never invested in the United States.19  The result
was that QIs could exclude certain customers from the QI system,
especially “undeclared accounts.”20
• QIs Were Primarily Banks—Because the QI system was primarily
aimed at custodial relationships, QIs were almost always banks or
trust companies.  If a U.S. taxpayer wanted to avoid any possibility
of U.S. reporting, they could invest in (i) a foreign mutual fund or
18. Shell entities were also used to further obfuscate the true owner of foreign
assets held by U.S. taxpayers.
19. In most FFIs, the percentage of the customer base that invested in U.S.
source assets was very small.  Although I am not aware of any statistics, it could be
less than 1% in many cases.
20. These are accounts where the customer refused to identify themselves.
5
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private equity fund treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes,
or (ii) any other financial institution that was not a QI.
• QI Audits—The QI audit was not really an audit, but rather was a list
of procedures that needed to be performed.  The procedures did
not include any requirement for a QI auditor to look for, or report
fraud.  More importantly, the focus of the audit was on reviewing
customer accounts within the QI system, and not testing to deter-
mine whether U.S. taxpayers were avoiding reporting by (i) invest-
ing in foreign source assets, (ii) holding U.S. source assets in a
foreign shell entity (or entities), or (iii) failing to declare
themselves.
As will be described in Part II(E), these loopholes were front and
center on the minds of the IRS, Treasury, and congressional staff as they
proposed and drafted FATCA in 2009 and 2010.  But first, a brief discus-
sion of the LGT and UBS scandals is warranted so the reader can under-
stand the political backdrop under which FATCA was proposed and
enacted.
C. LGT and UBS Scandals21
In February 2008, it became public that German tax authorities had
purchased customer account information from an employee at LGT, a
bank in Lichtenstein with close ties to the royal family in Lichtenstein.
The German authorities apparently shared the information with countries
around the world and the IRS announced on February 26, 2008 that it was
initiating enforcement action against over 100 U.S. taxpayers with offshore
accounts at LGT.22In May 2008, an even bigger scandal erupted when the
United States arrested Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS private banker
who subsequently pleaded guilty one month later to helping U.S. taxpay-
ers evade U.S. tax through the use of offshore accounts.  The guilty plea
included all sorts of spy-like techniques used by Birkenfeld and his col-
leagues to avoid U.S. detection.  They included encrypted computers,
code words, smuggling diamonds in toothpaste tubes, and the list goes on.
It should be noted that Bradley Birkenfeld reportedly came forward
under the IRS’s whistleblower program in 2007 and had been disclosing
information to the IRS for many months.  However, he reportedly failed to
disclose information to the IRS and Department of Justice with respect to
one of his larger, if not largest, accounts (i.e., Igor Olenicoff).  As a result,
despite blowing the whistle on UBS, Mr. Birkenfeld was prosecuted and
received a forty-month sentence.23
21. See PSI STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 80–110 (providing significantly
more detailed description of tax evasion facilitated by LGT and UBS).
22. See IRS and Tax Treaty Partners Target Liechtenstein Accounts, INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=179387,
00.html.
23. See Bradley Birkenfeld: UBS Informant to Begin Prison Sentence Friday, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/04/
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On June 30, 2008, the IRS filed a John Doe summons with the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida requesting that UBS
disclose to the IRS all its U.S. customers that had potentially been avoiding
U.S. tax.24  One day later, the court approved the serving of the John Doe
summons.  UBS refused to comply with the summons arguing that under
Swiss bank secrecy law, they were not allowed to disclose customer
information.
On July 17and 25, 2008, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (PSI) held highly publicized hearings on offshore ac-
counts.25  At this hearing, IRS Commissioner Shulman gave testimony on
the IRS efforts surrounding offshore accounts and also stated the follow-
ing with respect to the QI system:
[W]e are working on enhancements to the program to increase
the level and quality of information reporting coming through
the program. Specifically, we are considering changes to the reg-
ulations to require QIs to look through certain foreign entities—
such as trusts—to determine whether any U.S. taxpayers are ben-
eficial owners.  We are also considering a regulation to have QIs
report U.S. taxpayers’ worldwide income to the IRS in certain
cases—not just U.S. source income.26
In addition, the PSI report also made several findings and recommenda-
tions surrounding the QI system, including:27
• Abuses by LGT and UBS—“LGT and UBS have assisted their U.S. cli-
ents in structuring their foreign accounts to avoid QI reporting to
the IRS, including by allowing U.S. clients who sold their U.S. secur-
ities to continue to hold undisclosed accounts and by opening ac-
counts in the name of non-U.S. entities beneficially owned by U.S.
clients.”
bradley-birkenfeld-ubs-in_n_410753.html; Former UBS Banker Sentenced to 40 Months
for Aiding Billionaire American Evade Taxes, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST.(Aug. 21, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-tax-831.html. Birkenfeld has
been fighting his sentence and is also pursuing a large whistleblower settlement
pursuant to I.R.C. § 7623(b).  Although some have argued the DOJ was too tough
on Birkenfeld, no one can dispute that the Birkenfeld case has sent a strong mes-
sage to future whistleblowers that they should disclose everything they know, espe-
cially if their own hands are not 100% clean.
24. See PSI STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 n.10; Justice Department Asks Court to
Serve IRS Summons for UBS Swiss Bank Account Records, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST.(June
30, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv08579.htm.
25. See generally PSI STAFF REPORT, supra note 9.
26. Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearing before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs,
110th Cong. 61 (2008) (statement of I.R.S. Comm’r Doug Shulman) [hereinaf-
ter2008 PSI Hearing].
27. See PSI STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 16 (finding abuses by LGT and UBS
and recommending (a) requiring reporting of foreign source income and deter-
mination of beneficial owner, and (b) strengthening QI audits).
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• Require Reporting of Foreign Source Income and Determination of Beneficial
Owner—“[T]he Administration should strengthen the Qualified In-
termediary Agreement by requiring QI participants to file 1099
Forms for: (1) all U.S. persons who are clients (whether or not the
client has U.S. securities or receives U.S. source income); and (2)
accounts beneficially owned by U.S. persons, even if the accounts
are held in the name of a foreign corporation, trust, foundation, or
other entity.  The IRS should also close the ‘QI-KYC Gap’ by ex-
pressly requiring QI participants to apply to their QI reporting obli-
gations all information obtained through their Know-Your-
Customer procedures to identify the beneficial owners of
accounts.”
• Strengthen QI Audits—“The IRS should broaden QI audits to require
bank auditors to report evidence of fraudulent or illegal activity.”
Given the evidence obtained from Bradley Birkenfeld and the infor-
mation uncovered during the PSI investigation, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) was pursuing UBS on two fronts.  First, DOJ and the IRS were pur-
suing enforcement of the civil John Doe summons, and of potentially much
more concern to UBS, they were also pursuing criminal charges for tax
evasion and securities violations.  Ultimately in February 2009,28 UBS
agreed to: (i) a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) of the criminal
charges, (ii) the payment of a $780 million fine, and (iii) the disclosure of
an unknown number of accounts.29
The DPA did not settle the civil issues surrounding the John Doe sum-
mons.  As a result, the day after the DPA was announced, the DOJ filed a
motion with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to
enforce the John Doe summons to obtain information on up to 52,000 ac-
counts.30  UBS continued to refuse to provide the information requested
in the summons because it could violate Swiss bank secrecy law.
Instead of allowing the Court to decide the conflict of laws issue be-
tween American and Swiss law, the IRS and UBS ultimately settled the John
28. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS, No. 09-60033
(S.D. Fla. 2009), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/ubs.
pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2012); UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S.
DEPARTMENT JUST. (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09136.htm.
29. Ultimately, it has been reported that information on approximately 250
U.S. customers was turned over to the U.S. government. See, e.g., David Voreacos,
Credit Suisse May Settle U.S. Probe by Admitting Wrongdoing, Paying Fine, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-15/credit-suisse-
likely-to-settle-u-s-probe-than-risk-charges-lawyers-say.html.
30. See Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance—Obtaining the Names of U.S.
Clients with Swiss Accounts Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs 5 (2009) (statement of John DiCicco, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Tax Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice), available at http://www.justice.
gov/tax/DOJ_Testimony_JDicicco.pdf.
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Doe summons in August 2009.31  The result was that UBS agreed to dis-
close information on approximately 4,450 U.S. customers.32  The criteria
for determining U.S. customers that would be disclosed were carefully
chosen to ensure the United States would get information on the largest
and potentially most abusive accounts.
D. 2009 Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative (2009 OVCI)33
In March 2009, the IRS announced an offshore voluntary compliance
initiative (the “2009 OVCI”).  This settlement initiative ultimately ended in
October 2009 and resulted in over 14,700 U.S. taxpayers admitting they
had previously unreported offshore accounts.34  Aside from some process-
ing issues, the 2009 OVCI was universally viewed as being successful.  Part
of the reason for this success was that U.S. customers of UBS were con-
cerned their account information was going to be included in the 4,450
accounts UBS agreed to disclose to the IRS.
For non-UBS customers and non-Swiss bank customers, there was less
concern about their account information immediately being turned over
to the United States.  Nevertheless, many U.S. taxpayers were concerned
given (i) the possibility of future whistleblowers at their banks, and (ii) it
was anticipated the IRS would obtain a wealth of information from the
2009 OVCI related to non-UBS banks.35  In addition, U.S. taxpayers were
also worried about the long-term implications of certain proposals in Presi-
dent Obama’s fiscal 2010 budget proposal (issued in May 2009).36
E. FATCA Is Conceived
Given the loopholes and issues surrounding the QI system, there was
general agreement among senior IRS officials that something had to be
done.  The question became: what specific changes should be made to the
QI system to make it more effective at preventing U.S.taxpayers from hid-
ing income offshore?  The obvious answer was to attempt to address the
31. See IRS to Receive Unprecedented Amount of Information in UBS Agreement, IN-
TERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0
,,id=212124,00.html.
32. UBS’s agreement to disclose customer information supplemented the
company’s prior disclosure of approximately 250 customers as part of the deferred
prosecution agreement (DPA) in February 2009.
33. The IRS also subsequently had a 2011 OVCI.
34. See Doug Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., Address to N.Y. State
Bar Ass’n Taxation Section Annual Meeting (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=218705,00.html (disclosing that over 14,700
taxpayers participated in 2009 OVCI).
35. For example, customers of foreign financial institution A were worried
that another customer of A would participate in the 2009 OVCI and cause the IRS
to start aggressively pursuing foreign financial institution A in a manner similar to
UBS.
36. See infra Part II(E).
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problems identified in Part II(B) above.  Given the July 2008 PSI report37
and given the IRS Commissioner’s testimony at the July 17, 2008 hear-
ing38, it was pretty clear that QIs should be required to:
• Report both U.S. and foreign source income for U.S. taxpayers
• Determine if U.S. taxpayers are the beneficial owners of foreign
shell entities
• Review all customer accounts within the affiliated group to identify
U.S. taxpayers
Thus, the concept of FATCA was born.  However, as the IRS started down
this path, several issues arose:
• Would U.S. Taxpayers Switch Their Investments from QIs to Other Finan-
cial Institutions Not Part of the QI System (i.e., NQIs)?—Because the QI
system was a “carrot” primarily utilized by custodial and private
banks, the QI system practically did not include many other finan-
cial institutions.  There was significant concern that if the United
States made it difficult for U.S. taxpayers to hide money offshore in
bank and trust companies, many U.S. taxpayers would start hiding
their money in other offshore vehicles (e.g., various funds) to avoid
paying U.S. tax.  Thus, any proposal needed to either (i) expand
the QI regime to include substantially all foreign financial in-
termediaries, or (ii) adopt some other approach to reduce the op-
portunities of U.S. tax cheats39 to invest with NQIs.
• Would QIs Abandon the QI system?—As described in Part II(A), the QI
system was designed to encourage FFIs to become QIs so they could
avoid disclosing the identity of their customers to potential compet-
itors (e.g., U.S. banks).  Given the QI system utilized this carrot ap-
proach, there was significant concern that many QIs would
abandon the system if they were now required to perform substan-
tial additional burdens, including: (i) report both U.S. and foreign
source income for U.S. taxpayers, (ii) determine the true beneficial
owner of a shell entity, and (iii) perform customer due diligence on
their entire customer base to identify potential U.S. customers.
As a result, it was decided the new and improved QI system
needed to have a penalty for failure of a FFI to participate in the QI
system.  The proposed penalty was to be the imposition of withhold-
ing tax on U.S. source payments (both income and gross proceeds)
to a NQI.
• Should the QI System be Changed Administratively or Through Legisla-
tion?—Because the QI system was created through (i) Treasury reg-
ulations and (ii) contracts with FFIs, the IRS/Treasury could have
changed the QI rules without legislation.  However, given the desire
37. See PSI STAFF REPORT, supra note 9.
38. See 2008 PSI Hearing, supra note 26, at 55–64.
39. The term “tax cheat” is used throughout the Article to refer to U.S. tax-
payers that use, or want to use, offshore accounts to evade their U.S. tax
obligations.
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to impose withholding taxes on payments to NQIs, legislation was
needed.
The President’s Fiscal 2010 budget released in May 2009 included sev-
eral provisions to address offshore tax evasion.40  Given the known
problems with the QI system, the proposals to change the QI system were
not a surprise.  QIs were going to be required to:
• Report both the U.S. and foreign source income for U.S. taxpayers,
• Determine whether U.S. taxpayers are the beneficial owners of for-
eign shell entities, and
• Potentially review all customer accounts within an affiliated group
of companies to identify U.S. taxpayers.41
In addition, the Fiscal 2010 Green Book42 also included various provisions
that addressed concerns that (i) QIs would abandon the system, and (ii)
U.S. tax cheats might seek out investments with NQIs (e.g., offshore mu-
tual funds).  The two major additional provisions were:
• Withholding Tax—If a foreign financial intermediary did not be-
come a QI, it would be subject to a withholding tax on both U.S.
source income and gross proceeds.43  This was primarily designed
to encourage foreign financial intermediaries to either continue
their QI status, or adopt QI status.  However, the imposition of a
withholding tax on NQIs had the practical effect of extending the
impact of the QI regime to a much broader group of foreign finan-
cial intermediaries, including offshore funds.44  In 2008, it was esti-
mated there were approximately 5,600 QIs.45  The number of
financial institutions ultimately impacted by FATCA is likely into
the hundreds of thousands.
• Third Party Reporting of Cross-Border Transfers—If a U.S. financial in-
termediary or a QI transferred money or property outside the U.S.
40. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 41 (2009), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY
2010.pdf [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATIONS].
41. Id. at 42.  However, it is important to note the Administration’s proposal
did not require affiliated entities of a QI to definitely perform due diligence on
their entire customer base.  Rather, Treasury was given authority to address QI
affiliates.  This author’s intention was that if an affiliated QI adopted certain proce-
dures, signed a management representation that the procedures were functioning,
and agreed to potentially be subject to an audit by a third party, then the affiliated
QI should be able to avoid performing detailed customer due diligence on its cus-
tomer base.
42. Because the cover of the Administration’s revenue proposals is tradition-
ally green in color, it is often referred to as the “Green Book.”
43. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 40, at 43.
44. This was not crystal clear from the Fiscal 2010 Green Book and may not
have been the intention of some that participated in the drafting.  Nevertheless,
given its general applicability to NQIs and given the Green Book included author-
ity to exempt a diverse group of NQIs, this author thought it applied to offshore
funds.  However, others involved in the process may not.
45. See 2008 PSI Hearing, supra note 26, at 60.
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reporting regime, there would be a reporting requirement to the
IRS.46  This provision was intended to make it more difficult for
U.S. tax cheats to transfer money or property to NQIs that were
outside the reporting system.47
It should be noted, that as originally conceived in the Fiscal 2010
Budget Proposals, FATCA did not:
• Allow “recalcitrant account holders” (i.e., customers that refused to
either identify themselves, or allow reporting of their information
to the IRS).  Rather, it was assumed that QIs would identify all cus-
tomers, and U.S. customers would be forced to agree to disclosure
of their tax information to the IRS or have their account closed.
• Have “passthru payments” (i.e., I.R.C.§ 1471(d)(7)) which can ef-
fectively re-source foreign source income to U.S. source income.48
Finally, when FATCA was being designed, there was a clear under-
standing that it would not eliminate all opportunities for a U.S. taxpayer to
hide income offshore.  For example, a U.S. taxpayer could invest in non-
U.S. source assets with an NQI and avoid reporting to the IRS.  However,
the hope was that substantially all reputable FFIs would become QIs.  If
this occurred, U.S. tax cheats would be relegated to second or third tier
FFIs that could cause the U.S. tax cheat to question whether they really
wanted to invest in such institutions.
F. FATCA Legislation Ultimately Adopted49
Legislation was ultimately introduced in October 2009,50 modified
again in December 2009,51 and finally adopted in March 2010 as part of
the Hire Act.52  Although there were several changes during drafting, two
of particular interest were:
46. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 40, at 48.
47. However, U.S. tax cheats could still move money offshore the “old fash-
ioned way” (i.e., in suitcases).
48. For additional discussion see infra Parts II(f), III(B), IV(A)(2).
49. The President’s proposals referred to participating FFIs as QIs.  However,
once FATCA was committed to legislative language, the nomenclature changed
from QIs to P-FFIs (i.e., participating FFIs) and NP-FFIs (i.e., non-participating
FFIs).  The remainder of this Article will generally refer to P-FFIs and NP-FFIs.
50. See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, H.R. REP. NO. 111-3933
(2009); see also Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, S. REP. NO. 111-1934
(2009); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009 (2009).
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-4213 (2010); see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4213, THE “TAX EXTENDERS
ACT OF 2009” (2009).
52. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
§§ 501–535, 124 Stat. 71 (2010); see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH
CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN SENATE
AMENDMENT 3310, THE “HIRING INCENTIVES TO RESTORE EMPLOYMENT ACT” (2010).
Although FATCA technically includes sections 501–535, section 501 is the subject
of this Article.
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss3/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR304.txt unknown Seq: 13 26-NOV-12 11:22
2012] OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS 483
• Recalcitrant Account Holders—As originally outlined in the Fiscal
2010 Green Book, FATCA would have required FFIs to identify the
country of residence of all customers—or at least determine
whether a customer was a U.S. person or not.53  The Green Book
was silent as to what a qualified foreign financial institution (Q-FFI)
should do if a customer refused to provide adequate documenta-
tion to demonstrate they were not a U.S. person.
When first drafted by congressional staff, FATCA required that
a participating foreign financial institution (P-FFI) would close the
account of any customer that would not provide adequate docu-
mentation.54  In addition, if a P-FFI identified a customer as a U.S.
person, the FFI would be required to report information to the IRS
for such U.S. customer.
It was understood that requiring that (i) a customer’s account
be closed and (ii) information on U.S. customers be reported to
the IRS, could cause issues with local law.55  However, given the
coordinated worldwide effort to address offshore accounts,56 it was
hoped that recalcitrant account holders would ultimately not be tol-
erated in the worldwide banking system.  In addition, if a FFI
wanted to be a P-FFI, it was thought that the FFI could choose to
not do business with customers that appeared to be U.S. persons
(especially new customers) and refused to sign a waiver allowing
the P-FFI to disclose the customer’s information to the IRS.
As FATCA went through the legislative process, many com-
ments were received surrounding local law restrictions on (i) dis-
closing customer information to the IRS, and (ii) closing of existing
accounts.  As a result, the final version of FATCA adopted in March
2010 provided that a P-FFI could have so-called “recalcitrant ac-
count holders.”57  It was still hoped that eventually recalcitrant ac-
count holders would not be tolerated in the worldwide banking
system, but it was understood this could take a number of years to
accomplish.
• Passthru Payments58—As FATCA was being developed, it was under-
stood that in a post-FATCA world a U.S. tax cheat could accomplish
53. See GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 40.
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-3933(presenting initial version of proposed I.R.C.
§ 1471(b)(1)(E)(ii)); see also S. REP. NO. 111-1934 (same).
55. For example, some customers may not want to identify themselves, local
bank secrecy laws may prevent the disclosure of customer information without the
customer’s consent, and local laws may prevent the closing of an account.
56. See G20 Summit—Leaders’ Statement, THE GUARDIAN ¶ 15 (Apr. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/g20-economy.
57. See I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(F), (d)(6) (West 2010).
58. See I.R.C. § 1471(d)(7) (West 2010) (including in definition of “passthru
payment” “any withholdable payment or other payment to the extent attributable
to a withholdable payment”).  Because the first part of § 1471(d)(7)’s definition is
relatively non-controversial, for purposes of this Article, the term “passthru pay-
13
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their objective by investing in non-U.S. source assets with a non-
participating foreign financial institution (NP-FFI).  The hope was
that over time, the number of reputable FFIs and countries that a
U.S. tax cheat could invest in would gradually be eliminated.  In
order to accomplish this result, it was understood the United States
may need to ultimately convince other countries to adopt FATCA
style systems, or alternatively participate in a multilateral P-FFI
system.59
Although it was understood U.S. tax cheats could invest in non-
U.S. source assets through a NP-FFI, the general intention was to
prevent U.S. tax cheats from investing in U.S. source assets through
a P-FFI.  During the legislative process a group of tax professionals
met with congressional staff to express concern that (i) U.S. tax
cheats could invest in non-U.S. source assets in NP-FFIs, but more
importantly,(ii) tax planners could setup a “blocker entity” to effec-
tively allow U.S. tax cheats to indirectly invest in U.S. source as-
sets.60  The first observation was not a surprise, but the second was
to certain staff.
The concern about a “blocker entity” can best be described by
an example.  Assume Offshore Fund A invests in U.S. source assets
and further assume A elects to become a P-FFI.  Further assume
that a NP-FFI (e.g., another offshore fund X) is an investor in A,
and a U.S. tax cheat is an investor in X.  Given this scenario, the tax
professionals were concerned that payments from A to X would be
foreign-to-foreign payments and therefore not subject to withhold-
ing under FATCA.  Thus, tax planners could avoid FATCA by estab-
lishing a P-FFI as a blocker between U.S. investments and NP-FFIs
or U.S. tax cheats.
Primarily as a result of this meeting, the passthru payment pro-
vision61 was inserted into FATCA.  Thus, in addition to withholding
on a withholdable payment, a P-FFI needs to withhold on other pay-
ments “to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment.”  This
provision has the potential to effectively (i) re-source a portion of
what would otherwise be a foreign source payment to a NP-FFI or
recalcitrant account holder, and (ii) impose a 30% withholding tax
on the portion of such payment re-sourced to the United States.
Continuing with the example above, assume a U.S. tax cheat
invests $1 million in non-U.S. source assets with X (a NP-FFI) and
further assume X invests the $1 million in non-U.S. source assets
ment” is referring to the second part of the definition (i.e., “other payment to the
extent attributable to a withholdable payment”). Id.
59. For further discussion, see infra Part IV(b)(2).
60. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. 765, at § II (providing brief
description of concern surrounding blocker FFIs); see also I.R.S. Notice 2010-60,
2010-37 I.R.B. 329, at § V.B. (same).
61. See I.R.C. §§ 1471(b)(1)(D), 1471(d)(7) (West 2010).
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with A (a P-FFI).  Finally, assume A makes a $100,000 payment to X.
Given these facts, the passthru payment rules provide that A must
agree to withhold 30% of any “withholdable payment” or “other
payment to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment.”62
Because the $100,000 payment relates to foreign sources, it is not a
“withholdable payment”.  However, it may be a payment “attributa-
ble to a withholdable payment” to the extent A invested in U.S.
assets and received payments from such assets.
As a result, even though a payment from a P-FFI to a NP-FFI
appears to entirely relate to foreign source assets, the passthru pay-
ment rules could result in the imposition of withholding tax by ef-
fectively re-characterizing a portion of the foreign source payment
as a U.S. source payment.  The intended effect of this provision ap-
pears to have been (i) to discourage U.S. tax cheats from investing
in non-U.S. assets with NP-FFIs, and (ii) more directly, penalizing
NP-FFIs for doing business with a P-FFI.63  The hope may have been
to encourage NP-FFIs to become FFIs.
In addition, the passthru payment rules also apply to a recalci-
trant account holder.  Thus, if a recalcitrant account holder invests
in non-U.S. source assets with a P-FFI, the passthru payment con-
cept could result in a resourcing of foreign source income to U.S.
income and result in withholding.
As will be discussed in Parts III(B) and IV(A)(2), the passthru
payment rule has been very controversial because (i) it can be ad-
ministratively complex, and (ii) it re-sources foreign source income
to U.S. source income in situations where there may be no tax
abuse.
III. SELECTED FATCA ISSUES
Although there are many issues surrounding FATCA,64 this Article
will discuss three issues.  The first two are specific issues surrounding (i)
customer due diligence procedures,65 and (ii) passthru payments.66  The
customer due diligence issue was recognized during the original concep-
tualization of FATCA, while the passthru payment issue resulted from deci-
sions made during congressional drafting of FATCA.  Although these two
issues need to be addressed by IRS/Treasury in both the short and the
long-run, the passthru payment issue is particularly complicated.
62. Id.
63. As will be discussed in Part IV(A)(2), because of the additional adminis-
trative burdens it imposes on the P-FFI, the passthru payment also effectively pe-
nalizes the P-FFI for doing business with an NP-FFI.
64. For a discussion of the various issues surrounding FATCA, see supra note
1.
65. See infra Part III(A).
66. See infra Part III(B).
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The third issue is a general question: Will FATCA ultimately accom-
plish its goals?67
A. Customer Due Diligence Procedures for Affiliated P-FFIs
As discussed in Part II of this Article, one of the major problems with
the QI system was the ability of a QI to effectively (i) ignore customer
accounts at affiliated FFIs, and (ii) even also ignore customer accounts
within the QI.  One of the major FATCA design features was to require
that a QI (now referred to as a P-FFI) have procedures in place to (i)
identify all U.S. customers within the P-FFI,68 and (ii) potentially identify
U.S. customers in affiliated FFIs.69  When FATCA was being designed, it
was understood this would cause certain issues, especially in the short-run.
For example, assume a hypothetical foreign bank has one million cus-
tomers throughout the world, but only (i) 1% of such customers are U.S.
persons, and (ii) 4% of the foreign bank’s customers invest in the United
States.  In this fact pattern, FATCA theoretically requires the foreign bank
to perform detailed customer due diligence procedures on its entire one
million customer base in order to properly identify the 5% that could be
directly impacted by FATCA.  Needless to say, one would expect the for-
eign bank to be unhappy about this requirement.  This problem was
known when FATCA was being conceptualized.
As a result, in order to make FATCA operational in the short-run, this
IRS official was expecting that affiliated entities of the P-FFI would have an
ability to demonstrate there were few if any material U.S. customers that
would require reporting to the IRS.  I was hoping this requirement could
be met by some combination of written procedures and representations by
affiliates of the P-FFI that there were no known U.S. customers.70  It
should be noted the final FATCA statutory language provided for
“deemed compliant” FFIs.71
As will be discussed in Part IV(B) of this Article, this IRS official be-
lieved the long-term answer to the customer due diligence issue for affili-
ated FFIs was additional multilateral agreement among various tax
authorities.
B. Passthru Payments72
As discussed in Part II(F), the passthru payment concept originated
during legislative consideration of FATCA and was aimed (i) in general at
further discouraging the existence of NP-FFIs, and (ii) partially addressing
67. See infra Part III(C).
68. I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).
69. I.R.C. § 1471(e) (West 2010).  However, the Treasury was granted author-
ity to provide exceptions for affiliated FFIs.
70. Or potentially no known U.S. customers above a certain level of assets.
71. I.R.C. § 1471(b)(2) (West 2010).
72. For a further discussion of passthru payments, see supra note 58.
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the blocker issue.  Although the ultimate goal was clearly worthwhile, it
has become clear since the enactment of FATCA that implementation of
the passthru payment regime poses many significant challenges,
including:
• How does one determine whether a payment to a NP-FFI (or recal-
citrant accountholder) is “attributable to a withholdable payment?”
• Potential restrictions under local law to the collection of withhold-
ing tax on payments that appear in form to be unrelated to the
United States.
As of the drafting date of this Article,73 the IRS/Treasury has tenta-
tively decided to apply a pro-rata approach74 in order to determine pass-
thru payments.  Thus, if 10% of a P-FFI’s worldwide assets are U.S. assets,
then 10% of its non-U.S. source payments to an NP-FFI or recalcitrant
account holder could be subject to a 30% U.S. withholding tax.
Needless to say, there are lots of issues and administrative complexity
with this approach. Possibly in recognition of these issues and complica-
tions, the IRS announced in July 2011 that the passthru payment rules will
not be effective until payments after January 1, 2015.75  The IRS likely be-
lieves it has bought itself some more time to address the passthru payment
issue.
However, informal discussions with several FFIs and their advisors
suggest:
• Many FFIs view the passthru payment rules as the proverbial straw
that could break the camel’s back in their decision whether to be-
come a P-FFI.
• Other FFIs (i.e., those that clearly need to be a P-FFI because of
their client base) are apparently considering only doing business
with other P-FFIs so as to reduce their FATCA system design issues.
• Most FFIs do not want to start building a system to do withholding
tax until they know whether the passthru payment rules will be ap-
plicable, and if so, how they will be applied.
As will be discussed in Part IV(A)(2) of this Article, this observer suspects
the IRS will need to make some decisions soon with respect to the passthru
payment rules.  The decisions will not be easy and will depend upon sev-
eral factors.
C. Will FATCA Ultimately Accomplish Its Goals?
Before answering this question, it is helpful to briefly discuss my per-
spective on the goals of FATCA.  The overall goal was to reduce the num-
ber of U.S. taxpayers using offshore accounts to hide income from the
IRS.  Major specific goals included:
73. November 15, 2011.
74. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-34, 2010-17 I.R.B. 612, at § II.
75. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124, at § II.C.2.
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• Encourage U.S. Taxpayers to Participate in the 2009 OVCI—Given that
FATCA was conceptualized at approximately the same time as the
2009 OVCI was being developed,76 one goal of FATCA was to fur-
ther encourage participation in the 2009 OVCI.77  Clearly, to the
extent U.S. taxpayers were fearful FATCA would substantially in-
crease future reporting of information on offshore accounts to the
IRS, U.S. tax cheats should have been more likely to participate in
the 2009 OVCI.
• Cure Deficiencies in the QI Reporting System for U.S. Taxpayers—This was
the main goal of FATCA with the end result that it should be sub-
stantially more difficult for a U.S. tax cheat to hide income offshore
in a P-FFI.
• Provide an Offshore Reporting Model for Other Countries to Emulate—Al-
though not all involved in developing FATCA necessarily shared
this goal, it certainly was one of my goals.  Furthermore, as dis-
cussed in Part IV(B), I believe the ultimate long-term success of
FATCA may depend upon whether other countries adopt some ver-
sion of FATCA, or at least adopt detailed customer due diligence
procedures of the type embedded in FATCA.
Given the IRS has had two very successful offshore voluntary disclo-
sure initiatives (i.e., the 2009 OVCI and the 2011 OVCI),78 the first spe-
cific goal seems to have been met.79  However, the second and third goals
are more important.  In order for them to be met, the United States needs
to create a viable, long-term reporting system that is accepted by the vast
majority of FFIs around the world.  Unfortunately, the jury is still out.
The major weakness of FATCA is that the United States is attempting
to unilaterally require FFIs to report information to the United States.
When FATCA was being conceptualized, it was this author’s hope that the
United States would aggressively market the FATCA concept to other ma-
76. The 2009 OVCI was announced in March 2009 and the President’s Fiscal
2010 Budget Proposals were released in May 2009.  The 2009 OVCI was originally
scheduled to end in September 2009, but was ultimately extended to October
2009.
77. However, other goals were more important (e.g., curing deficiencies in
the QI reporting system).
78. See IRS Shows Continued Progress on International Tax Evasion, INTERNAL REV-
ENUE SERVICE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=2457
68,00.html (announcing that, as of September 15, 2011, approximately 30,000 tax-
payers had voluntarily disclosed previously unreported offshore accounts resulting
in almost $3 billion of additional collections).  In addition, one should expect that
as disclosures are processed for the 2011 OVCI, the amount of collections should
increase substantially.
79. One will never really know how many additional U.S. taxpayers decided to
participate in the 2009 and 2011 OVCIs because of FATCA.  Nevertheless, FATCA
was one of the factors that many U.S. taxpayers likely considered when determin-
ing whether to participate.
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jor countries.  It is not clear whether this has been occurring.80  The issues
caused by this unilateral action include:
• Resistance by FFIs to (i) perform extensive customer due diligence
procedures on all of their customer bases to identify a relatively
small number of U.S. taxpayers, and (ii) create a specific reporting
and withholding system applicable to only the United States.
• Various sovereign country issues, including (i) bank secrecy laws,
and (ii) laws prohibiting the closing of accounts.
Some might argue the United States should work through the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to obtain a
global consensus.  Given such an effort could take many years (if not de-
cades) to accomplish, the alternative is for the United States to approach
other countries individually to pursue multilateral action.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Part is divided into short-run and long-term recommendations
surrounding the issues discussed in Part III of this article.81  Hopefully
these recommendations will encourage discussion and comment.  The au-
thor’s ultimate goal is to attempt to improve the chances of FATCA being
a long-term success by greatly improving transparency surrounding off-
shore accounts held by U.S. taxpayers.
A. Recommendations Important to the Short-run Success of FATCA
1. Customer Due Diligence Procedures for Affiliated FFIs
As discussed in Part II(B), the QI system had a major loophole in that
a QI and its affiliates could select which customer accounts to include in
the system.  When developing FATCA, there was a clear need to require P-
FFIs to address all accounts held by a P-FFI and its affiliates.  However, as
discussed in Part III(A), it was generally understood that requiring de-
tailed customer due diligence of affiliated FFIs could be difficult until
there is more multilateral agreement surrounding the appropriate cus-
tomer due diligence procedures.
As a result, the IRS/Treasury should balance (i) the urge to write
airtight rules surrounding customer accounts in affiliated FFIs versus (ii)
the need to develop an operational rule prior to more multilateral agree-
ment on the appropriate customer due diligence procedures.  The ap-
proach should be balanced taking into consideration the following factors:
• The nature of the affiliate FFI’s customer base,
80. Informal discussions suggest most of the IRS’s attention has been on im-
plementing FATCA in the United States without much attention being paid to-
wards educating other countries about joining with the United States to leverage
the FATCA system.  Hopefully, my information is incorrect.
81. There are many other FATCA issues, but this Article does not attempt to
address them.
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• Management representations surrounding the nature of accounts
in the affiliated FFI and the procedures/controls in existence to
avoid doing business with material U.S. customers, and
• The possibility that an external auditor would review a P-FFI’s rep-
resentations surrounding affiliated FFIs.
Existing IRS guidance has attempted to consider some of these fac-
tors, but the general operating presumption seems to be that affiliated
FFIs will go through the same customer due diligence procedures as P-FFIs
unless the affiliated FFIs can meet the very restrictive criteria for a
“deemed compliant FFI.”82  Among the criteria is that the affiliated FFI
does not have any business outside of its country of organization.
I agree the long-term goal of FATCA should be very detailed customer
due diligence procedures for all customer accounts held by an affiliated
FFI.  However, as described in Part IV(B), the method for obtaining this
long-term goal is to obtain better international agreement surrounding
customer due diligence procedures.  In the meantime, the IRS/Treasury
should be more willing to rely on management’s representations sur-
rounding procedures/controls at affiliated FFIs.83  In addition or as an
alternative, IRS/Treasury should consider relaxing the deemed compliant
FFI criteria to allow certain affiliated FFIs that operate cross-border to
qualify.
2. Passthru Payments84
As summarized in Part III(B), the requirement to withhold on “other
payments to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment” (i.e., re-
ferred to as passthru payments for this Article) has created major issues.
Given these complications and given passthru payments were not part of
the IRS’s original conceptualization of FATCA, I am tempted to suggest
the IRS/Treasury figure out a way to avoid adopting or enforcing the
position.85
Unfortunately, the analysis is not so straightforward.  In case you do
not want to wade through Parts IV(A)(2)(a)and IV(A)(2)(b), I basically
conclude the IRS/Treasury should err on the side of not implementing
the passthru payment regime unless IRS/Treasury is highly confident it is
administrable and will not have any material negative consequences.  My
suspicion is the IRS may struggle to meet these two criteria.  One option
that has been proposed is to adopt a fixed percentage for the portion of
the passthru payment attributable to a withholdable payment.
82. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B. 765, at § III(B) (discussing
“deemed compliant FFIs”); see also id.at § VI (discussing affiliated FFIs).
83. Reliance is warranted as long as the nature of the business supports such
representation.
84. See supra note 58.
85. This could involve either obtaining a legislative change, or more likely a
creative reading of the existing Internal Revenue Code provisions.
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Assuming the IRS decides to retain the passthru payment concept,
the IRS/Treasury should seriously consider a fixed percentage approach.
It would be substantially more administrable and would likely result in
more FFIs deciding to become P-FFIs.  In the long-run, the solution is to
obtain multilateral agreement from other major countries to require with-
holding on all payments from a P-FFI to a NP-FFI.86
a. Analytical Framework
First, the IRS needs to evaluate whether there is a potentially worka-
ble solution to the passthru payment issue.  If not, its decision should be
obvious.87  If there is a potentially workable solution, but it is has the po-
tential to create major administrative issues for FFIs, the IRS needs to bal-
ance the costs and benefits of implementing the solution with respect to
FFIs.
• Benefit—The potential benefit is that the mere existence of the pass-
thru payment rules could drive NP-FFIs to become P-FFIs.  This
would obviously be a good result.  This could occur if FFIs on the
fence decide they need to do business with P-FFIs, but do not want
to suffer the passthru withholding.  It could also occur if a material
number of respected P-FFIs decide they will only do business with
other P-FFIs and thus, NP-FFIs could become pariahs in the finan-
cial system.
My sense is that the first scenario will not be that common be-
cause FFIs will likely have NP-FFIs with which they can do business.
As to the second scenario, I have heard some large respected FFIs
are thinking of only doing business with other P-FFIs.88  If this is
the case, the passthru payment rules could actually drive certain
FFIs to decide they want to be part of the club.
• Cost—The passthru payment rules have the potential to drive FFIs
away from the FATCA system.  This could occur if either (i) NP-FFIs
decide they do not want to do business with P-FFIs because of the
additional withholding, or more likely (ii) FFIs decide they do not
want to suffer the administrative burden of determining passthru
payments and all the other requirements of FATCA.  Said differ-
ently, the passthru payment rules could be the proverbial straw that
breaks the camel’s back as a FFI is deciding whether to become a P-
FFI.  This observer believes there is a real riskthe camel’s back
86. NP-FFIs would be effectively excluded from the worldwide financial sys-
tem unless they either (i) subject themselves to a 30% withholding tax, or (ii)
decide to become a P-FFI.  In order for this to occur, several major countries
would need to agree in order to have the leverage to implement such a radical
system.
87. Do not enforce the provision.
88. Personally, I am skeptical there will be many P-FFIs that ultimately refuse
to do business with NP-FFIs.  Tax and systems employees may be of such view, but
once the business folks get involved, I suspect there will be less interest in cutting
off revenue sources.
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could be broken if the IRS/Treasury retains the pro-rata approach
to passthru payments proposed in IRS Notice 2011-34.
In addition to evaluating the impact of the passthru payment rule on
FFIs, the IRS/Treasury should attempt to evaluate the impact on U.S. tax
cheats potentially investing in (i) P-FFIs, and (ii) NP-FFIs.  In theory, the
passthru payment rules should result in some additional withholding tax
from these two categories of individuals.  However, practically one won-
ders what the real world consequences might be.
• U.S. Tax Cheats Investing in P-FFIs—If a U.S. tax cheat is going to
invest in a P-FFI, they will presumably (i) become recalcitrant and
(ii) only invest in non-U.S. source assets so as to avoid 30% with-
holding on U.S. source income and gross proceeds.  If this occurs,
the passthru payment rules could re-characterize a portion of the
foreign source payments to U.S. sources and result in additional
U.S. withholding tax.  However, the question is how will a U.S. tax
cheat react to this possibility?
If the withholding tax is imposed on a relatively small portion
of the payments, it is possible the U.S. tax cheat may decide to bear
the withholding tax.  However, given the withholding tax can po-
tentially be imposed on gross proceeds, my suspicion is that U.S. tax
cheats may decide to take their business to a NP-FFI.  In addition,
to the extent the IRS will likely be monitoring recalcitrant account
holders, one suspects P-FFIs will not be anxious to have too many
recalcitrants in their customer bases, especially if they have any U.S.
indicia.  Finally, if I were a U.S. tax cheat, I would worry about a P-
FFI ultimately being more likely to turn-over my name to the IRS,
than a NP-FFI.89
For all the above reasons, I don’t believe the passthru payment
rule will have much impact on U.S. tax cheats attempting to directly
invest with P-FFIs.  Rather, I believe U.S. tax cheats will want to
avoid P-FFIs and only invest in NP-FFIs.
• U.S. Tax Cheats Investing in NP-FFIs—If a U.S. tax cheat is planning
to invest in non-U.S. assets with a NP-FFI, the passthru payment rules
would impose no direct withholding tax.  However, if the NP-FFI
wants to hedge its counter-party risk to the U.S. tax cheat, it needs
to decide whether to do so by investing with another NP-FFI or in-
vesting with a P-FFI.  If it chooses the P-FFI, it could suffer a with-
holding tax on a passthru payment.  Thus, one would presume that
89. For example, the United States may be able to make a treaty request to
obtain the names of a P-FFI’s customers that are recalcitrant and have U.S. indicia.
Historically, treaty requests have required the requesting countries to have an indi-
vidual’s name and account information.  However, the U.S. has recently been able
to obtain information from Switzerland by just describing fact patterns in which it
was interested (e.g., the UBS and Credit Suisse cases).  If this approach spreads to
other countries, U.S. tax cheats will likely want to avoid any financial institution
with any sort of reporting responsibility to the United States.
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a NP-FFI would want to hedge any risk with another NP-FFI, rather
than a P-FFI.
If the U.S. tax cheat wants to invest in U.S. assets with a NP-FFI
and the NP-FFI invests in U.S. assets, presumably when the dust set-
tles the passthru payment rules will impose some withholding tax.
This should occur in the blocker fact pattern discussed above and
other similar fact patterns.
b. Passthru Payments Summary
In summary, there seem to be two major benefits of the proposed pro-
rata passthru payment rule.  First, because it is so administratively burden-
some, it could cause certain P-FFIs to refuse to do business with NP-FFIs
and recalcitrant customers.  Second, it attempts to address the so-called
blocker issue.  The primary cost of the rule is that it is administratively
complex and may result in many FFIs refusing to participate in FATCA
because of the administrative difficulties.
Because IRS/Treasury has accumulated substantial information from
their discussions with FFIs and others, they are in the best position to
weigh the relative costs and benefits.  However, I recommend IRS/Trea-
sury err on the side of not implementing the passthru payment regime
unless it is highly confident it is administrable and will not have any material
negative consequences on the long-term success of FATCA.  My suspicion
is the IRS may struggle to meet these two criteria as the rule is currently
proposed.  Although it would be nice if the passthru regime could be
made workable, it is likely not crucial to the long-term success of FATCA.90
Rather, because of its complexity, it has the potential to do more harm
than good in the short-run.91
One option that has been proposed is to adopt a fixed percentage for
the portion of the passthru payment attributable to a withholdable pay-
ment.  Assuming the IRS decides to retain the passthru payment concept,
the IRS/Treasury should seriously consider a fixed percentage approach.
It would be substantially more administrable and likely result in more FFIs
deciding to become P-FFIs.  Finally, if the IRS/Treasury can develop an
alternative to addressing the blocker issue, it would be extremely helpful,
even if it were only a short-run solution.  One possibility might be to adopt
an anti-abuse rule that specifically targets blocker entities.  For example, if
a P-FFI is determined to have been formed or availed of for the purpose of
circumventing FATCA, the P-FFI would retroactively lose its P-FFI status
and potentially be subject to other penalties.92
90. For a discussion of what is needed to make FATCA a long-term success,
see supra notes 93–101.
91. Depending upon how FFIs react, it is possible the passthru payment re-
gime could cause FATCA to “crash and burn.”  Given what is at stake, the IRS/
Treasury should not risk this possibility.
92. In addition, if another P-FFI had knowledge of such activity, they could
also be subject to various penalties or sanctions.
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In the long-run, the solution is to obtain multilateral agreement from
other major countries to require withholding on all payments from a P-FFI
to a NP-FFI.  In essence, NP-FFIs would be excluded from the worldwide
financial system unless they either (i) subject themselves to a 30% with-
holding tax, or (ii) decide to become a P-FFI.  For this to occur, several
major countries would need to agree in order to have the leverage to im-
plement such a radical system.
B. Recommendations Important to the Long-term Success of FATCA
1. Unilateral vs. Multilateral Action
In order to ultimately address offshore tax evasion by U.S. taxpayers,
FATCA needs to be successful in the long-run.  The effort to impose trans-
parency on offshore accounts held by U.S. taxpayers (and other countries’
taxpayers) is a marathon, not a sprint!
The key question is: What end result will indicate FATCA has been
successful in the long-run?  I believe the two key indicators will be:
• The United States is Assured that Adequate Customer Due Diligence is Done
by P-FFIs and Their Affiliates—As discussed in Parts III(A) and
IV(A)(1), there currently are issues with FATCA unilaterally at-
tempting to force FFIs and their affiliates to perform detailed due
diligence on their entire customer base.
• The Investment Options Available to Offshore U.S. Tax Cheats are Very
Limited—Given a dedicated U.S. tax cheat can avoid FATCA by in-
vesting in non-U.S. assets with a NP-FFI, a key goal of the IRS/Trea-
sury going forward should be to limit the investment opportunities
for U.S. tax cheats.
There are two key variables surrounding investment options:
(i) the number and quality of financial institutions, and (ii) the
range of non-U.S. assets available to invest in.  If ultimately U.S. tax
cheats are relegated to investing in very small, disreputable finan-
cial institutions, or the assets available to invest in are severely lim-
ited, offshore tax evasion should be greatly reduced.  If both
occur,93 offshore tax evasion should be effectively eliminated.94
There are two basic approaches the United States could use to accom-
plish both of these indicators:
• Unilateral Action—First, the United States could continue down the
course of unilateral adoption of FATCA with the hope that the U.S.
investment market is sufficiently large that substantially all FFIs will
need to become P-FFIs.  Although this is theoretically possible, it is
93. Tax cheats are relegated to investing in very small, disreputable financial
institutions, and the assets available to invest in are severely limited.
94. Some diehard U.S. tax cheats may take to burying their money in the
backyard, or pursuing other options (e.g. investing in diamonds), but as a practical
matter the vast majority of U.S. tax cheats currently using offshore accounts will
waive the white flag and agree to pay their U.S. taxes.
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practically very unlikely.95  For example, even if P-FFIs and their
affiliates perform adequate due diligence, all a U.S. tax cheat needs
to do is find one reasonably reputable NP-FFI and invest in non-
U.S. assets with such NP-FFI.  Given there are likely to be reasonably
reputable FFIs that decide to be NP-FFIs, this is a real concern.
• Multilateral Action—Alternatively, the United States could pursue
multilateral action to help accomplish both indicators.  Multilateral
action could take many forms.  For example, the United States
could work through the OECD to obtain a global consensus.  How-
ever, such an effort could take many years96 (if not decades) to
accomplish.  One alternative is for the United States to approach
other major countries individually about jointly addressing offshore
accounts.  Again, there are various options.
The most limited option would be to pursue discussions with
other major countries and attempt to reach agreement about the
appropriate customer due diligence procedures to be performed.97
If several major countries agreed on customer due diligence proce-
dures, it could go a long way towards successfully addressing the
customer due diligence issue in FATCA for affiliated FFIs.98  Specif-
ically, it could significantly strengthen the IRS’s hand when at-
tempting to force a FFI to perform detailed due diligence
procedures on its entire customer base (i.e., FFIs and affiliated
FFIs).
An additional major benefit from multilateral action would be
to reduce the investment options for a U.S. tax cheat (i.e., reduce
the number of (i) NP-FFIs and (ii) countries whose assets a U.S. tax
cheat could invest).  This could be accomplished by a multilateral
FATCA system.99
95. Nevertheless, the IRS/Treasury needs to continue implementing FATCA
so as to (i) effectively force U.S. tax cheats to invest in NP-FFIs, and (ii) create a
model for other countries to hopefully follow.  If the U.S. were to abandon
FATCA, it would be a serious long-term setback to addressing offshore tax evasion
both in the U.S. and the world.
96. See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. (OECD), About the TRACE
Group, CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
taxtreaties/aboutthetracegroup.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
97. The IRS/Treasury may be able to piggy-back to a certain extent on the
desire of developed countries to address anti-terrorist financing activities.  Thus,
there are both tax and non-tax reasons for attempting to strengthen customer due
diligence procedures around the world.
98. See infra Part III(A).
99. It could also be accomplished through a bilateral exchange of informa-
tion among countries.  However, this author believes it is better for the IRS to
receive information directly from the financial institution, rather than relying on
another country to forward the information.  Aside from administrative issues with
interposing an intermediary, it would seem to be much easier to force FFIs to
participate in a multilateral FATCA system than it will be to get countries with bank
secrecy to participate in information exchange arrangements.
25
Harvey: Offshore Accounts: Insider's Summary of FATCA and Its Potential F
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR304.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-NOV-12 11:22
496 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 471
2. What Might a Multilateral FATCA System Look Like?
The easiest way to illustrate a multilateral system would be to explain
what would happen if another country joined with the United States in
implementing FATCA.  Assume Country A decided to join the United
States in its FATCA system.  In such case, the following would result:
• If a FFI wanted to invest in either the United States or Country A, it
would need to execute a FFI agreement with both the United States
and Country A.
• The FFI would agree to identify customers from both the United
States and Country A and report information on such customers to
the appropriate country (i.e., the United States or Country A).
The United States would obtain three principle benefits:
• First, because a FFI would need to perform detailed due diligence
on its customer base to identify both U.S. and Country A customers,
it would mitigate some of the criticism currently applicable to
FATCA (i.e., it is a unilateral approach that requires FFIs to per-
form an unreasonable amount of due diligence to identify the pro-
verbial needle in the haystack—a U.S. customer).
• Second, for a FFI contemplating not participating in FATCA, it
would effectively have to make a decision to not do business with
both the United States and Country A.  This is obviously a tougher
decision than just boycotting the United States.
• And third, a U.S. tax cheat should effectively be prevented from
investing in both U.S. and Country A source assets.
Country A would also receive substantial benefits.  Specifically, it
could leverage the desire of FFIs to do business in the United States.  Said
differently, if Country A tried to implement FATCA on its own, it is highly
likely that a substantial number of FFIs would boycott Country A’s stand-
alone FATCA system.  However, if Country A joins-up with the United
States, it will be substantially more difficult for a FFI to boycott both the
United States and Country A.
Although it would be ideal if all countries in the world agreed to join
the United States’ FATCA system, in reality, the United States likely only
needs a few other major countries to participate in a multilateral FATCA
regime to mitigate many of the issues being raised with the United States’
unilateral adoption.  Plus, as each additional country joins in a multilateral
FATCA system, the number of investment opportunities available to a U.S.
tax cheat would decline.  Although there will always be some tax cheats
that are willing to go to great lengths to avoid paying tax, one suspects as
the number of countries participating in a FATCA type system increases,
viable investment options will become few and far between.
3. Would Countries Need to Agree to All Aspects of FATCA?
In short, the answer is “no.”  The major aspects of FATCA include: (i)
the requirement to perform due diligence on a FFI’s entire customer base
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss3/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR304.txt unknown Seq: 27 26-NOV-12 11:22
2012] OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS 497
(including affiliated FFIs) to identify the true owner of an account, (ii) the
imposition of a 30% withholding tax if a customer is either recalcitrant or
a NP-FFI, and (iii) the reporting of information to the resident country for
resident customers.
Certainly, it would be helpful if all countries participating in a multi-
lateral FATCA arrangement could agree on all three major aspects of
FATCA.  However, in the real world the chances of different countries
agreeing on all aspects of FATCA are not high.  Fortunately, agreement on
all three aspects is not necessary for the United States to accomplish its
goals.  Rather, all that is needed is for the United States and other coun-
tries to agree on (i) a standard set of customer due diligence requirements
to be performed by P-FFIs, and (ii) some stick to get FFIs to participate.
The imposition of a 30% withholding tax on payments to NP-FFIs
could be the stick, but each country would be free to choose its own pen-
alty to be applied to a NP-FFI.  However, the penalty would need to have
some teeth to it.
When it comes to reporting, there also could be flexibility as to (i) the
content of the information, and (ii) the flow of the information.100  In
addition, although it would introduce complications, it may be possible to
have some countries adopt a withholding regime, and others adopt a re-
porting regime.101  Both the withholding and reporting regimes would
need to be subject to an audit.
V. OVERALL CONCLUSION
The United States and foreign countries have made significant head-
way in the past several years addressing the use of offshore accounts to
evade tax.  The United States has benefited from whistleblowers and two
very successful offshore voluntary compliance initiatives.  FATCA was en-
acted to help give the IRS the long-term tools necessary to better combat
offshore tax evasion by U.S. taxpayers.
However, because FATCA is a unilateral action by the United States,
there are several major implementation issues surrounding FATCA, in-
cluding how to (i) require detailed customer due diligence procedures for
a FFI and its affiliates, (ii) implement the potentially very complicated
passthru payment rules, and (iii) minimize the offshore investment oppor-
tunities for U.S. tax cheats (i.e., NP-FFIs).
100. For example, instead of the FFI reporting information to the residence
country (e.g., the U.S.), information could flow first from the FFI to the country
where the FFI is located (i.e., source country), and then from the source country
to the residence country.  As described in note 89, supra, this is not my preferred
flow of information, but it could be made to work if the source country is
cooperative.
101. See Daniel Pruzin, Financial Institutions: As U.S. Prepares Hammer, U.K., Ger-
many Ready to Leave Swiss Banking Secrecy Intact, Analysis & Perspective, Foreign In-
come (BNA) 198 DER J-1 (October 13, 2011) (describing recent withholding
agreements between Switzerland, UK, and Germany).  Given these agreements,
this is an issue that needs to be further evaluated.
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Because it is important that FATCA be successful in the long-run,
Treasury is urged to use significant judgment when first implementing
FATCA with respect to the following:
• Customer Due Diligence for Affiliated FFIs—In general, the current pro-
posed guidance surrounding affiliated FFIs and deemed compliant
FFIs may be too restrictive.102  The IRS/Treasury should consider
allowing certain affiliates of a P-FFI to use policies and procedures
to demonstrate adequate due diligence on their customer base.  Al-
ternatively, the deemed compliant FFIs provision could be ex-
panded to allow FFIs that operate cross-border to potentially
qualify.
• Passthru Payment Rules—The current proposed passthru payment
rules103 are very complex, and likely unadministrable.  The IRS/
Treasury should be seriously considering either (i) not enforcing
the rules, or (ii) adopting an alternative (e.g., a fixed percentage
for determining the portion of a payment that is “attributable to a
withholdable payment,” an anti-abuse rule aimed at blocker enti-
ties, or both).  Given many FFIs will not make a decision whether to
become a P-FFI until they fully understand the passthru payment
rules, the Treasury needs to make decisions quickly.
In the long-run, IRS and Treasury could greatly increase the
probability of FATCA’s success by actively discussing FATCA with other
major countries.104  The goal of such discussions should at a minimum be
to agree on common customer due diligence procedures.  Preferably,
other countries would join the United States in administering a multilat-
eral FATCA type system.  Foreign countries would benefit greatly from us-
ing the United States’ leverage to effectively force FFIs to join the system.
The United States would benefit from reducing the number of investment
options available to tax cheats, and making recalcitrant account holders
significantly less likely.
Finally, financial institutions worldwide should seriously consider at-
tempting to help forge an international consensus.  Currently, some finan-
cial institutions appear as though they are planning to resist efforts for
increased transparency.  Although financial institutions will clearly incur
substantial costs from FATCA, those costs may pale in comparison to the
costs that could be incurred over the next five to twenty years as other
countries implement their own specific systems.  It would be substantially
cheaper for financial institutions if there is one global standard, rather
than ultimately building separate FATCA type systems for each country.
102. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011 I.R.B. 765, at § III(B) (discussing
“deemed compliant FFIs”); see also id.at § VI (discussing affiliated FFIs).
103. See id. at § II.
104. If not already taking place, these discussions should be taking place in
the very near future because it will take many years to reach agreement with other
major countries.
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